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Abstract—In the current technology advancement, biometric 
template provides a dependable solution to the problem of user 
verification in an identity control system. The template is saved 
in the database during the enrollment and compared with query 
information in the verification stage. Serious security and 
privacy concerns can arise, if raw, unprotected data template is 
saved in the database. An attacker can hack the template 
information in the database to gain illicit access. A novel 
approach of encryption-decryption algorithm utilizing a design 
pattern of Model View Template (MVT) is developed to secure 
the biometric data template.  The model manages information 
logically, the view shows the visualization of the data, and the 
template addresses the data migration into pattern object. The 
established algorithm is based on the cryptographic module of 
the Fernet key instance. The Fernet keys are combined to 
generate a multiFernet key to produce two encrypted files (byte 
and text file). These files are incorporated with Twilio message 
and securely preserved in the database. In the event where an 
attacker tries to access the biometric data template in the 
database, the system alerts the user and stops the attacker from 
unauthorized access, and cross-verify the impersonator based on 
the validation of the ownership. Thus, helps inform the users and 
the authority of, how secure the individual biometric data 
template is, and provided a high level of the security pertaining 
the individual data privacy. 
Keywords—Biometric template; template-database; 
multiFernet; encryption-algorithm; decryption-algorithm; Twilio 
SMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The biometric template is a digital sample of a distinct 
feature obtained from a biometric trait stored in the database, 
aimed at authenticating and recognizing an individual [1], [2]. 
The template is built on something you have (fingerprint, 
facial, iris and voice) as opposite to something you know, such 
as passwords or Personal Identification Number (PIN). It 
compares the individual‟s characteristic extracted to make a 
match score, the match score is computed, so that the resultant 
value is in the range (0, 1), where 0 means not matching and 1 
means perfect match. If the matching fails, the person can 
repeat the verification attempt for the second time. 
Numerous kinds of algorithmic methods are introduced by 
different scholars to transform the biometric traits into a 
template, for instance, the bio-hashing and concealable 
biometric [3]. The bio-hashing extracts, for example the 
fingerprint (minutiae point) and convert it into the 
mathematical file know as a biometric template. The template 
is then transformed and stored in the database, where 
matching is performed directly. However, despite the 
advantages of the biometric data template in verifying and 
authenticating the individual access, the storage template 
database can lead to high risk, such as template abuse, 
modification of the existing template, addition of a new 
template into the database, and stolen templates in the 
database [4], [5]. The stored template information can be 
substituted by an attackers pattern; the impostor can create the 
physical spoofing from the original pattern to gain unlawful 
access to legitimate individual‟s information i.e. Medical 
records, which may result in false accept or false reject, 
depending on the motive of the impostor or mount a denial-of-
service (DoS) and counterfeit document. The impostor can 
inject or hijack the characters of the lawful person‟s template 
directly into the storage database and replace the original 
template with the fake template. 
Lately, different approaches have been put in place to 
improve the protection of biometric templates, for instance, 
the hardware-based and software-based accesses. The 
hardware-based contain a closed recognition system such as 
the smart card or handheld device, where the template is 
securely laid in. The card or device makes up only the 
template information and the matcher scores (Match-on-card), 
that aid in mitigating an occurrence on the biometric templates. 
The software-based solution stores a revised template that do 
not disclose data about the original biometric traits. It ensures 
that the biometric data stored in the templates are coded (using 
a secret key) and practically infeasible to discover the 
encryption key or regenerate the original fingerprints of a user. 
The purpose of this study is to identify the known attacks 
against the biometric data template in the database from the 
review of the literature and propose a solution to effectively 
protect the biometric data template in the database. The 
suggested solution is established on an encryption-decryption 
algorithm with a design pattern of model view template 
(MVT). The algorithm is based on the cryptographic module 
integrated with Fernet key instance, where two Fernet keys are 
combined to generate a multiFernet key (K) for the encryption. 
The Fernet keys guaranteed that, a template data encrypted 
can‟t be revealed or read without the secret key, making it 
unmanageable for an attacker to circumvent or breakthrough 
into the database server. The cryptographic module included 
the security tools such as Jinja2, Wtforms, SQLAlchemy [6]. 
Thus, securely prevented unauthorized access to sensitive 
template information in the database. 
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The study, therefore, provided a useful insight on the 
current biometric technology vulnerability attacks and the 
mechanism to protect the biometric data template in the 
database for the everyday government or private registration 
application system. 
It helps inform the users and the authority of, how secure 
the individual biometric data template in the database is, and 
provided a high level of the security pertaining the individual 
data privacy and integrity. Because any attempt in the 
database can inform the two parties. The key contribution of 
this article is: 
 Providing insight of the possible vulnerability attacks 
on the biometric data template in the database. 
 Implementation of the various sets of security tools and 
standards that facilitate the safety of the biometric data 
template in the database. 
 The proposed framework architecture model of the 
encryption- decryption algorithm integrating the key 
management in securing the biometric data template 
information in the database. 
 The Integrated biometric data template with the Twilio 
message in the database for security purposes. 
Based on the above contributions, this article provides a 
simple mechanism to reduce the attackers from violating 
individual biometric data template in the database. The simple 
mechanism alleviates the database security performance as 
this paper does not require a complex computer algorithm for 
the biometric deployment, thus, minimizing overheads and 
costs. 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section discusses about some previous works related 
to the attacks of the biometric data template in the database, 
and proposed techniques to secure the biometric data template. 
This is useful to map this paper with the current research trend 
about the biometric data template safety measure alongside the 
template database. 
A. Vulnerabilities Attacks of Biometric Template in the 
Database 
The vulnerability attacks of the biometric template in the 
database have evoke fears among the users of biometric 
applications. This is because of a person‟s privacy, public 
liberties infringements and trustworthiness [7], [8]. For 
instance, an impostors intention to corrupt and interchange a 
genuine template with a fake template, the deliberate 
alteration of an enrolled template by an impostors pattern or 
biometric operator, has deterred user‟s trustworthiness and 
fear in the technology itself [9]. 
The most vulnerability attacks of the biometric technology 
occur in the template database (see Table I). This is because 
the template database is responsible for comparing the 
individual‟s characteristic extracted to make a match score. 
Thus, a potential target of the attack. The attacker aims to pull 
out information related to the quality used in the encoding 
algorithm either directly or indirectly via an externally 
compromised system (if the server is online). The taken 
template can be used to attempt a man-in-the-middle attack, 
such as a replay attack or delete the stored templates to mount 
a denial-of-service attack [9], [10]. 
According to Arjunwadkar et al. [11] the impostor can 
intervene the stored template to compromise the biometric 
traits, breaks the security loopholes to replace, change or edit 
the existing template of the legitimate person [12]. Gobi and 
Kannan argued that the templates are tempered by adding the 
new user template or fake template to the database, altering 
the current template in the storage and deleting the existing 
genuine one [13]. Bindha et al. [14] indicated that the template 
data can be substituted by an attacker‟s template to attain 
illegitimate access to a system. Study of Mwema et al and 
Raju et al. [15], [16] observed that spoofing at the template 
database is the most determined epidemics experienced in 
biometric technology. 
Manvjeet et al. [17] presented that the cross-matching is 
the possible exploitation of biometric templates, because the 
template data are used for extra aim than the proposed aim. 
Thus deprived of the individual‟s permission, for instance, 
fingerprint pattern taken from a bank‟s record can be used to 
search for an unlawful fingerprint database for criminal 
investigation [18]. In Uganda, the 15,277 million voters‟ 
fingerprint intended for National Identity Cards (NIC) was 
extracted from NIRA database, this provoked a serious 
concern of the citizens [19]. Yet, when a person‟s template is 
stolen, it is stolen forever and not easy to revoke, since every 
individual has (one face, ten fingers, two eyes etc.). In 
traditional password-based authentication systems, once a 
password is compromised, the new one is reissued [18]. If the 
biometric data is compromised, it can result into four 
vulnerabilities: 
 The template being substituted or replaced by an 
attacker‟s template to gain illegal access. 
 Physical spoofing being produced or generated from 
the template to gain illegal access to the organization 
as well as other schemes that employ similar biometric 
feature. 
 The template being taken or reiterated to the matcher to 
acquire illegal access. 
 If not correctly insured, the template can be used for 
cross-matching across different database records to 
covertly track an individual deprived of their consent. 
Li and Kot [20] suggested a privacy safety (hiding 
scheme) for the weak-thinned fingerprint template. In their 
study, the user‟s identity is concealed in the thinned 
fingerprint image during enrollment and a fingerprint template 
stored in an online database for authentication. They claimed 
that applying such a system, it is impracticable for the attacker 
to expose the individuality of the user from stealing the 
template collected from a compromised online template 
database [21]. 
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TABLE. I. POSSIBLE ATTACKS ON THE BIOMETRIC DATA TEMPLATE IN THE DATABASET 
Targeted position Possible attacks Countermeasures References 
Data collection Spoofing Liveness detection, Challenge/response [49],[50] 
Raw data extraction and 
transmission 
Eavesdropping 
Data Transmitted over an encrypted path/secure channel 
Challenge/response 
[51]–[54] 
 Replay attacks 
Communally authenticate/use symmetric key or 




Bind biometric to PKI certificate; Data Transmitted over an 
encrypted path 
[56] 
Data processing, transmission Brute force Timeout/lock out policies [51],[53],[54] 
 Eavesdropping Data Transmitted over an encrypted path/secure [51]–[54] 
 Replay attacks 
Communally authenticate/use symmetric key or 




Bind biometric to PKI certificate; Data Transmitted over an 
encrypted path 
[56] 
Template retrieval Brute force Timeout/lock out policies [51],[53],[54] 
 Eavesdropping Data Transmitted over an encrypted path/secure [51]–[54] 
 Replay attacks 
Communally authenticate/use symmetric key or 








Database compromise (reading 
template, replacing 
template(s)) 
Hardened server DB access controls; Sign and store 
encrypted templates; Store template on smart cards or other 
device. 
[51],[53] 
Matching scores transmission Hill climbs Trusted sensor (Mutual authentication); Secure channel [53],[54],[57] 
 Manipulation of match score 
Secure channel; Communal authentication between 
matcher and decision components 
[53] 
 
Component replacement (“yes 
machine”) 
Significant components [53] 
Decision Hill climbs Communal Authentication; Secure channel [53],[54],[57] 
Communication to application Eavesdropping Data Transmitted over an encrypted path/secure [51]–[54] 
 
Manipulation of match 
decision 
Data Transmitted over an encrypted path [53] 
Liu et al. [22] considered a cryptographic technique of 
secret transmission encryption to encode a plaintext for multi 
recipients and hide the recipients‟ identities. They suggested 
the cancellable biometrics and biometric cryptosystem to 
protect the template. In cancellable biometrics, instead of 
applying the original biometric data, a partial form is kept in 
the database, in this manner, an intruder cannot gain access to 
the unique pattern from the database. In biometric 
cryptosystem, the biometric data is encrypted before storing it 
in the database; this makes it rather hard for the attacker to 
decode the data and stealing the genuine template from the 
database. 
Elkamchouchi et al. [23] suggested method of 
cryptography which uses the image as an open key and 
arbitrary integers as a private key to compute the image [24]. 
Jain et al. [25], suggested a steganography to hide biometric 
data (fingerprint minutiae) in multitude images (face), whose 
function is to transmit the data. The carrier image can be an 
artificial fingerprint image, a face image or any arbitrary 
image. The suggestion is useful in a distributed system, where 
the raw biometric data are transmitted over an insecure 
communication channel and prevented a skimmer from 
reading sensitive information. They also discussed a novel 
application wherein, the facial feature of a user 
(eigencoefficient) is embedded in a host fingerprint image of 
the user to increase the security, then stored them on a smart 
card. The fingerprint of the person is compared to the 
fingerprint on the smart card. The false information hidden in 
the fingerprint is recovered and used as an additional basis of 
validity either mechanically or by a humanoid in a controlled 
biometric application. 
Emmanuel et al. [26] proposed the concealable biometric 
method to protect the template database. The cancellable 
biometrics involved repeatable distortion of an original 
biometric pattern intentionally based on a chosen non-
invertible transform, to enroll and authentication the system 
from the stored template. This reduced the template 
compromise and resolved the legitimate substitution of a 
privacy-related issue for matching against transformed vector 
and prevented the system from storing the new biometric traits 
of the user. 
Pratiba and Shobha [27] proposed a watermarking 
technique. The watermarking information on the biometric 
template data in the database allowed the legitimacy of the 
biometric contents to be verified, when retrieved for matching. 
The pixel value is used to hide the watermark information [28]. 
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In case an impostor tried to replace or forge the secured 
biometric template, the system notifies the database manager 
signifying something is wrong with the biometric template in 
the database [29]. Although, the watermark information 
prevented invader from altering the template, there is a small 
alteration in the genuine template as well as insufficient 
changes in the pixel. Hence, resulted in insecure template 
database protection. 
Nandakumar and Jain [30] proposed the fuzzy vault 
pattern using fingerprint and Iris. The study revealed that, 
multi biometric vault on thumbprints and irises achieved a 
Greater Accept Rate (GAR) of 98.2% at FAR of 0.01%. The 
matching GAR value of the person‟s irises and thumbprint 
vaults are 88% and 78.8% respectively. The safety of the 
system is at 41 bits and that of the thumbprint and irises 
offered 49 bits [31], [32]. In conclusion, the biometric vault 
provided improved recognition presentation and highest safety 
of the biometric data template. 
Ashish et al. [33] suggested the usage of string re-
arrangement to ease the protection of the template database. 
The biometric data is encrypted and discarded after 
constructing the comfortable template. During the verification, 
the stored data is deciphered using the secret key and matched 
against the captured query. The obstacle to the encryption-
based policy is the unprotected key control that exposed the 
decryption secret to the machine for each authentication. The 
advantage is the matching process hired for maintaining the 
matching accuracy [34]. 
Rathgeb et al. [35] proposed an alignment free iris key-
binding scheme with concealable transforms. They adopted 
Indexing-First-One (IFO) hashing to achieve non-invertible 
and cancelable transformation for biometrics and the 
cryptographic key-binding. The key-binding is separated into 
four levels cryptographic key generation, genuine and 
synthetic permutation, key-binding, hashed code generation 
and computer memory. The findings showed that the highest 
GAR of 96.37% at zero FAR with storage, record equal to 
1.90 kB was achieved. They further proposed useful key 
retrieval metric KRR for implementing the security analysis. 
The proposed embraces the flexibility while maintaining 
significant accuracy, public presentation and protection layer. 
The quality preservation of the accuracy performance at 
higher security levels is achieved and the method requires no 
re-enrollment and storage [36]. 
Yang and Martiri [37] proposed honey template-based 
template protection scheme to detect the biometric template 
database leakage. In the protection scheme, machine learning 
based classification algorithms is utilized to produce the sugar 
and honey templates applied in face [38]. 
Hine et al. [39] introduced a zero-leakage biometric 
cryptosystem to measure the performance reachable when 
fusing the data from the four available fingers of each field at 
feature and score levels, utilizing the inverse of both L1 and 
L2 distance metrics as matching scores. The four classifiers 
give an equal error rate (EER) of 0:67%. The proposed system 
guarantees no information leakage and it allows achieving a 
trade-off between privacy and credit rates. 
Dwivedi et al. [40] proposed a secrecy-protective 
cancelable irises template encoding and a new cancelable iris 
template on arbitrarily look-up table drawing. The method 
uses a number vector created from a changing-invariant 
character vector using 1-D Log Gabor filter usable to the iris 
picture. The experimentation is carried away on several iris 
databases to support the efficiency of the proposed attack. 
Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.37%, 0.43% and 0.79% for 
CASIA-V 1.0, CASIA-V3-Interval and ICE 2005 iris 
databases are achieved [41]. 
Prasad et al. [42] applied a novel approach based on 
modulo operation. The method utilizes consistent bit vector 
generated from pre-aligned IrisCodes. These IrisCodes are 
created by applying 1-D Log Gabor filter on the iris images 
using different iris datasets.  Equal Error Rate of 0.54% and 
0.86% for CASIA-V 1.0 and CASIA-V3-Interval iris datasets 
are achieved. The method satisfies revocability, unlikability 
and irreversibility criteria and it is difficult to regenerate 
original IrisCode [43]. 
Lai et al. [44] proposed a novel cancellable iris system, 
coined as IFO hashing inspired from the Min-hashing. Two 
new mechanisms, namely Hadamard product code and modulo 
thresholding function are inserted to further enhance the 
system. The IFO hashing scheme endures numerous security 
and privacy attacks such as a single hash attack, multi-hash 
attack, attack via record multiplicity and pre-image attack. 
Thus, enjoys fast similarity search property inherited from 
Min-hashing and can potentially be drawn out to identification 
task and other binary biometric features [45]. 
Zhao et al. [46] proposed an iris template protection 
method based on local ranking. It is established from the 
resolutions that the method is able to give 0.57% EER value 
for CASIA-V 1.0 and 0.79% EER value for CASIA-V3-
Interval and also cover all the security and revocable issues. 
Furthermore, Zhou and Ren [47] proposed a user-centric 
biometric validation system (PassBio) that allows end-users to 
encode personal patterns with light-weighted encryption 
scheme. The findings prove that no critical information of the 
templates can be revealed under both passive and dynamic 
approaches. It guarantees that only the comparison result is 
discovered and no key information about x and y can be 
memorized. It can be widely used in many interesting 
applications such as searching over encrypted data while 
assuring information protection and seclusion. 
Mai et al. [48] presented an acceleration of the guessing 
entropy, which reflects the expected number of guessing trials 
in attacking the binary template in the biometric application. 
The results revealed that, rushing has more than 6x, 20x, and 
200x speed upward lacking down the approximation accuracy 
in dissimilar system settings. 
In conclusion, no single biometric system is enough to 
protect the biometric template database to its fullest. Thus, the 
study, suggested the encryption-decryption algorithm based on 
the cryptographic module incorporating the Fernet key 
instance. The cryptographic module integrated the biometric 
traits (fingerprint, and face image) with persons biodata, to 
produce an encrypted byte and a text file, these files are 
securely kept in the database incorporated with Twilio 
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message. The approach is more secure and harder for an 
impostor to guess the key mixtures and suitable for use in 
many biometric software applications. 
III. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
This section explained the security tools and approach 
deployed in safeguarding the biometric data template in the 
database. The security tools installed are Jinja2, Wtforms, 
SQLAlchemy, Cryptography, Twilio programmable Short 
Message Service (SMS) and the encryption-decryption 
algorithm approach [58], [59]. 
The python flash is used as the development platform, 
because it contains inbuilt development server that provided 
simplicity, flexibility and fine-grained control, as considerably 
as a faster debugger to the network application. It allowed one 
to add security mechanisms to the application such as session-
based certification, function management, password hashing, 
basic hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), and token-based 
certification. 
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In this section, the proposed framework is presented and 
classified into three. The first is the Model View Template 
(MVT) incorporating Helper Utilities File system (HUF), 
useful in controlling the models function for securing the 
biometric data template. The second is the encryption 
algorithm for encoding the biometric features and biodata. The 
third is the decryption algorithm for decoding the encrypted 
ciphertext. 
A. The MVT-HUF Framework Architecture 
The Model View Template (MVT), a modification of the 
Model View Controller (MVC) for securing the template 
database is used as the design implementation pattern. The 
model is an object that controls, data logically, the view 
signifies the imagining of the information a model contains, 
execute the business lucidity and relate with a model to 
transmit data and renders a template. The template controls the 
information movement into model entity and keeps the view 
and the model differently. 
Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) shows the proposed framework 
architecture of the MVT-HUF System and the functional 
intent of the ePassport. The MVT is slightly modified to cater 
for security issues. For instance, the Wtforms was introduced 
for CSRF prevention, and helper, introduced to handle heavy 
processing between model and View. The biometric passport 
was used as an object acted as a model integrating fingerprint 
and facial image at the feature level with person‟s biodata, to 
derive a two byte and text file as a template. This template is 
securely kept in the database incorporated with the Twilio 
SMS. The encryption- decryption algorithm based 
cryptographic key management is applied to ensure the 
security of the template database. The algorithm accounted for 
the acceptable disparities in the biometric input. An impostor 
whose sample biometric is different from the enrolled 
biometric features, cannot break or recreate the private key. 
The biometric features encrypted stored a hashed value of the 
key as a template byte and text file and releases it only if the 
hashed value obtained for verification is the same. The hashed 
version can be functioned as a cryptographic key. With this 
invention, an attacker cannot obtain the original key outside 
the encoding scheme. 
In Fig. 1(b), it‟s realizing that the encrypted fingerprint 
and face image is kept in the file system (including the 
ciphertext of second key). Meanwhile, user biodata is stored in 
relational tables. It is a significant to recognize that the 
computer memory in a file system is implemented using 
random integers (IDs) that hold less meaning to the user at 
presentation layers as the presentation level IDs are computed 
from helpers other than coming from the database. 
B. The Encryption Algorithm 
In encryption process, the users enter the credentials. The 
username and password are compared with a copy that is kept 
in the database. If the details do not match, he/she is requested 
to re-enter either a new username or password, else if it 
matches an authentication code (AC) is produced and sent to 
the user via SMS. Upon the user receiving the authentication 
code, he/she is requested to enter the received authentication 
code. The authentication code is matched with a copy that is 
kept in the database. If the authentication code does not match 
with the copy stored in the database, the user is guided back to 
login interface. If it matches, the database generates two 
Fernet keys (K1 and K2). 
The Fernet keys are secret key of asymmetric 
implementation based on cryptography that supports key 
rotation in the form of byte key. The two keys are combined to 
further generate a multiFernet key (K) for encryption. The 
MultiFernet key (K) is integrated with biometric features 
(Face, Fingerprint) and biodata passing through the encryption 
algorithm to produce the biometric template as byte file and a 
text file. The two files are securely kept in the database. Fig. 2 
summarized the proposed implementation of the encryption 
algorithm. 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Overview of the Proposed Model of MVT-HUF System. (b) The 
Function Design of the E-Passport. 
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Fig. 2. Proposed Framework of the Encryption Algorithm. 
C. The Decryption Algorithm 
In decryption process, the administrator is requested to 
enter the credentials. The username and password are 
compared with a copy that is kept in the database. If the 
information does not tally, the administrator is requested to re-
enter either a new username or password, else if it matches an 
authentication code is produced and sent to the administrator 
via SMS. Upon receiving the authentication code, the 
administrator is asked to enter the received authentication 
code. The authentication code that the administrator entered is 
matched with a copy that is kept in the database. If the 
authentication code does not match with the copy stored in the 
database, the administrator is led back to login interface. If it 
matches, the database generates two Fernet keys (K1 and K2). 
The two keys are combined to further generate a multiFernet 
key (K) for decryption. The MultiFernet key (K) is integrated 
with biometric template (byte file and a text file) passing 
through the decryption algorithm to produce the plain text. 
Fig. 3 summarized the proposed implementation of the 
decryption algorithm. 
In case an attacker tries to access the biometric data 
template in the database, the system blocks the attacker from 
unauthorized access. Because the system cross-verify the user 
based on two dissimilar kinds of identification such as the 
knowledge base (something the user knows) and the 
possession factor (something the user owns) such as 
authentication code (AC). This is really important in securing 
up the biometric template information in the database. Even if 
the perpetrators are able to discover a user‟s password, they 
nevertheless lack the second kind of identification required to 
login to the application. Fig. 4 presented the suggested 
security measures in the encryption algorithm. 
D. Database models 
The SQLite3 is used as the proposed model for the 
development process, and the database switched to 
PostgreSQL, because of the object relational mapper 
(SQLAlchemy) for security purpose. The PostgreSQL has 
multi-value fields (aka arrays, aka nested tables) which can 
reduce the need for joins. Dramatically increase the 
performance of storing and retrieving the multi-dimensional 
data structures, and making it possible to write stored 
procedures in other programming languages such as C, Perl, 
Python and JavaScript V8 engine [60]. 
E. Comparison of the Current System 
The proposed framework and the encryption-decryption 
algorithm based on the cryptographic module in the 
multiFernet key instance performed better. User data template 
in the database is securely protected. The imposter cannot 
easily break into the system or read or re-generate a key. 
Therefore, using the proposed approach, prevented data being 
compromised by an impostor, hence provided higher security 
of individual privacy data. 
 
Fig. 3. Proposed Framework of the Decryption Algorithm. 
 
Fig. 4. Proposed Framework of the Security Mechanism in the Encryption 
Algorithm. 
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V. THE IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN 
This section discusses the security tools deployed for the 
implementation of the proposed encryption-decryption 
algorithm. 
A. Jinja2 Implementation 
Jinja2 is used as template engine containing variables and 
tags to direct the logic of the template. It provided a protected 
basis for mechanization of sampling the application and 
helped avoid cross-site scripting (XSS) occurrence through its 
powerful automatic Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) 
escaping system. The cross-site scripting (XSS) enabled the 
invaders to insert client-side scripts into web application 
sighted by different users. Fig. 5 presented the implementation 
code for Jinja2. Note that {%… %} is used to represent 
statements and {{…}} used to print the data. 
The primary function of a template engine is to sort out the 
logic from the horizon. Thus, the template engines considered 
obeys the following principles: 
1) A restricted set of command structures: such as Loop 
i.e. for, loop or while; Condition i.e. If, if else and else; Filter3 
i.e. {{Variable filter}}; Setting of variables and Printing of a 
variable. 
2) A mechanism to include other templates, to use 
inheritance of templates or to use macros, written entirely in 
the restricted instructions from above. 
3) No way to write pure code in the language that is used 
for the backing (i.e. PHP, Python or Java) within the template. 
B. Wtforms 
Wtforms generates applicant‟s passport forms, rather than 
coding Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). This helped 
protect the system from Cross Site Reference Forgery (CSRF) 
module. The CSRF implementation is pivoted around the 
exceptional token, put in a varied field on the form named 
csrf_token, rendered in the template, and passed from the 
browser back to the interface. The cryptography hashed 
function against the data enabled the attacker not to form the 
template database. Note that CSRF is a character of malicious 
exploitation of a website where unauthorized commands are 
transported from a user that the web application trusts. 
Through the Wtforms, the cross-site request forgery attack is 
prevented. 
Notice that, when carrying out the web page form using 
Wtforms and python, the contours are represented as class 
representatives. This allowed clearer backend validations 
before data proceeds to the database, meaning in case the 
front-end is tempered with, the Wtforms validations can be 
capable to manage the authentication. Fig. 6 presented the 
implementation coding for the applicant detail on the template 
side using Wtforms. 
C. SQLAlchemy 
The object relational mapper (SQLAlchemy) is applied to 
create database models instead of database drivers directly. 
The security advantage is to prevent the SQL- injection attack, 
zero-day attack for various databases plus other database 
exploited through the application, because the coercion is first 
practiced on every database transaction. With SQLAlchemy 
the user doesn‟t write SQL statements, instead make the class 
representative and the SQLAlchemy figures out the optimum 
and attack free SQL statement equivalence. The SQL 
Expressions can be applied independently of the ORM. When 
using the ORM, the SQL Expression language remains part of 
the public face API as it is used within object-relational 
configurations and queries. Notice that SQL injection is the 
location of malicious code in SQL statements via the web 
page input [60]. Fig. 7 presented a model of SQLAlchemy 
dependency layers. The SQLAlchemy helped in mapping this 
class to the corresponding table. 
 
Fig. 5. Implementation of „The Confirms Details' Template using Jinja2. 
 
Fig. 6. Implementation Code in the Template Side using Wtforms. 
 
Fig. 7. SQLAlchemy Dependencies Layers. 
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D. Cryptography 
In cryptography, plain text is encoded into coded text with 
the help of encryption algorithm, the coded text is decoded to 
plain text with the help of decryption algorithm. In both 
operations, the cryptographic key played a significant part. It 
limited the admission of the coded data so that the possessor 
of the key could decrypt cipher text properly. In this technique, 
it was expected that only the sincere user knows the 
decryption key. Therefore, cryptography, as a powerful tool in 
biometric technology, depends on the secrecy of cryptographic 
key and the key needed an efficient key management 
technique. The key management technique included the 
process of key generation, key modification and key sharing 
[61]. 
The cryptographic module encrypted the fingerprint and 
the face image based on a Fernet instance key. The key is 
categorized into two smaller keys: a 128-bit AES encryption 
key and a 128-bit SHA256 HMAC signing key. These keys 
are retained in a central source that keystone passes in a 
library to handle the encryption and decoding process. The 
Fernet key guaranteed that the message encrypted cannot be 
read missing the key. It involved the application of symmetric 
(secret key) authentication, that support Fernet key alternation 
via multiFernet key (class cryptography. fernet. Fernet(key)). 
The multiFernet performed the cipher code using first key 
in the list of Fernet instance. Then decrypt each key in turn. 
The key alternation replaced the old key to add a new key 
Infront of the list. The new message was encrypted to discard 
the old key. The Token rotation was offered by meth 
(multiFernet. rotate) as a primary key to prevent mutilation 
and decreases the trouble of attack. Hence, preserved the 
timestamp originally saved with the token. The successful 
rotated token was returned while unsuccessful rotated token 
returned an exception error such as (cryptography. Fernet. 
InvalidToken). Token rotation as offered by MultiFernet, is 
the best practice and the manner of cryptographic hygiene, 
designed to fix damage in case of an undetected event and to 
increase the difficulty of attacks [58]. 
E. The Twilio Programmable SMS 
The Twilio SMS is utilized to signal users and authority 
over SMS messages about unlawful entry to the system 
account and the database template. In case they are not the one 
accessing the record, then be able to identify. Twilio is a cloud 
communiqué system that offers SMS services to its users. The 
Twilio source fetches the logs for any outbound messages 
from the narrative, like the Sent folder in the email client. 
Utilize this data to update the customer relationship 
management (CRM) whenever a client gets a text message 
from the application. Or to see the recipients of an SMS 
message before it sends, to ensure they don't receive it before. 
It brings in any inbound messages to any of the Twilio 
numbers. This is like the email inbox. 
If you apply a single Twilio number to commit many types 
of messages, it can route the responses to the necessary people, 
founded along the sentiment score of the consistency of the 
message, who mailed it. Or what time it arrived in. It also sent 
lots of SMS messages while Parabola flow runs. This 
permitted one to send out custom or generic SMS messages to 
a list of recipients at scheduled times. Use the destination to 
send the weekly performance, remind occurrence of an event 
and threats coming up in the system, or constantly ping your 
details to remind you of any approval privileges to allow 
admittance to your certification. Once an approval of 
applicants is performed, the SMS confirmation message for 
biometrics scan is automatically sent to the applicant for the 
achievement. Fig. 8(a) and 8(b) illustrates the Twilio SMS 
sent to applicant for verification and biometric scan process. 
With the Twilio SMS, the system is non-traceable by the 
impostor, it also comprises safety mechanisms to circumvent 
hacking and despicable attacks to compromise the user‟s 
information and individual rights to secrecy during the 
personal information transmission. 
F. The Cryptographic Fernet Keys 
The cryptographic Fernet key is built on three criteria. The 
advanced encryption standard (AES) in coded block chaining 
(CBC) mode with a 128-bit key for encryption using the 
PKCS7 padding. The Hash-based Message Authentication 
Code (HMAC) uses the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256 
for authentication. The Initialization vector to generate a 
random secret number using os. urandom () [58]. The AES 
provides advantages such as high-level security and 
implementation ability that does not expose unauthenticated 
bytes. It encrypts the data that easily fits in the memory. 
It uses the parameter such as secret keys (byte) either in 
128,192 or 256 bits long and the CBC mode using the padding 
for block ciphers. The parameters rest on the IV and secret key. 
The IV is a unique public information, randomly 
unpredictable at the encryption time to prevent data repetition, 
making it hard for a hack to get patterns to crack into the 
template database. It ensured that, information is not leaked by 
the cipher text itself and prevented identical plaintexts from 
producing identical cipher text. The secret key protected the 
encrypted information. 
The HMAC is used to calculate the communication, 
validation using cryptographic hash functions, paired off with 
a private key. For example, class cryptography. hazmat. 
primitives.hmac.HMAC (key, algorithm, backend). This 
hashed algorithm randomly generated the bytes equal in 
duration to the digest_size of the secret hashed function kept. 
     
(a)    (b) 
Fig. 8. (a) Twilio Verification Message (b) Twilio Message for the 
Biometric. 
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G. Key Management for the Encryption Algorithm 
The encryption algorithm used is based on the combination 
of two Fernet keys, i.e. the first key (K1) and the second key 
(K2). User inputs original biometric features Image (I) and K2 
to generate K1-encoded (byte key). The K1-encoded is further 
applied to generate K1 decoded (string key) using K2. 
The K1 encoded is combined with K2 to generate 
multiFernet keys (K). The K is used in encrypting the Image 
(I) to realize the encrypted image file (I0). In order to 
guarantee the safekeeping of the biometric data in the database, 
the encrypted image (I0) is further re-encrypted with 
multiFernet key (K) to produce an encrypted byte and a text 
file (K10). The two files are securely stored in the database as a 
template. 
The encoding is the operation of transforming information 
(plaintext) into something that appears to be random and 
meaningless (ciphertext) so that it is unclear to anyone but to 
the intended receiver. Fig. 9 summarized the stepwise process 
for the key management of the encryption algorithm. 
Presented below are the key management using encryption 
algorithm with multiFernet key. 
H. Key Management for the Decryption Algorithm 
In order to acquire the original image (I) from the 
encrypted byte and text file (K10), the decryption process is 
simply the reversed engineering of the encryption step. K10 is 
decrypted using the multiFernet key (K) to realize the 
encrypted image (I0). The K is generated from a combination 
of Fernet keys (K1 & K2).  The multiFernet key (K) is further 
employed to decode the encrypted Image (I0) to produce the 
original image (I). If the formatted token is successfully 
decoded, the original plain text (I) is received as the result, 
otherwise an exception error can be produced. 
The decryption is the operation of changing encrypted 
information (secret code text) back to readable plaintext so 
that it is understandable again. Fig. 10 summarized the 
stepwise process for the key management of the decoding 
algorithm. 
Given is the key management of the decryption algorithm 
with multiFernet key. 
 
Fig. 9. Key Management of the Encryption Algorithm. 
 
Fig. 10. Key Management of the Decryption Algorithm. 
VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The Twilio SMS is implemented for the validation over 
unlawful access to the system account and the template 
database. In case an attacker attempts to access the biometric 
data template in the database, the system blocks the attacker 
from unauthorized access. Because the system cross-verify the 
user based on something the user owns such as authentication 
code (AC). The Twilio fetches the login for any outbound 
messages from the report as well as any inbound messages to 
any of the Twilio numbers. 
The Ubuntu 18.04 is used as a client server to provide an 
interface and allowed users to call for the services. Users are 
situated at workstations or on personal computers, while 
servers are located in the regional centers of the immigration 
offices, controlled in the powerful machines at the headquarter 
for the request and the response. The users and the server each 
have distinct jobs to perform. For example, in the biometric 
passport data processing unit, a user machine runs an 
application program, while the server mainframe runs another 
program that handles the database. Fig. 11 summarized the 
client-server architecture of the application system. 
The results are tested with user‟s biometric traits, 
containing 50 fingerprints and 50 face image templates 
incorporated with the personal biodata. The image size of 
fingerprint template extracted is 256X256 and resolution set to 
72 dpi. The face image is uniformly illuminated and captured 
from the right mind with no rotation or tilting, no apparitions, 
with a plain background colour. The end product of the image 
is set to 600dpi with 120 pixels as the standard, recommended 
by ISO/IEC [62], [63]. The encrypted byte and text files are 
incorporated with Twilio programmable SMS. The Twilio 
SMS message is auto-generated directly from the database, to 
alert users in case an attacker tries to access the database. The 
text message is one of the security mechanisms successfully 
implemented. It helps inform the users and the authority of, 
how secure is the individual biometric data template in the 
database. How the users are indirectly involved in awarding or 
refusing access to the exercise of their biometric template 
information. Because any attempt in the database can inform 
the two parties. 
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Fig. 11. Client-Server Architecture. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, various attacks against a biometric template 
database are highlighted and the techniques used to secure the 
contents of the biometric data template in the database are 
discussed. Since securing the biometric information in the 
database is one of the studies focuses, encryption-decryption 
algorithm approach is suggested based on the cryptographic 
module with the security tools such as Jinja2, Wtforms, 
SQLAlchemy and Twilio SMS. 
The encryption-decryption algorithm is developed to 
encrypt the biometric data in the database.  Two encrypted 
byte file and text file are generated, incorporated with Twilio 
message, securely stored in the database server. The database 
has security features that warn against any impostor attack 
alongside with persons information. The system can block the 
attacker from unauthorized access. This is really important in 
the security of privacy of the biometric template information 
in the database. Even if the perpetrators are able to discover a 
user‟s password, they nevertheless lack the second kind of 
identification required to login to the application. 
Living by the proposed framework in Fig. 2 and 4, the 
same conclusion can be drawn near the model. It can be well-
known that no biometric system is optimal. The decision as to 
which biometric is to be used can be prepared from the 
foundation of the kind of application and the degree of 
protection required. Therefore, the policymaker needs to 
design security-policies based on lawful ideologies and should 
include the input of various players to defend against the 
vulnerability of users‟ information. Because individual‟s data 
exist in every place online. Further experimental research on 
ways, to facilitate the database server with additional safety 
coding like hash functions and two factor authentications to 
prohibit data requests transmission and setting out principles 
and alertness session to all mediators at the start of the 
engagement before being granted access to personal 
information. 
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